Introduction
The main goal of this paper is to establish empirically that, contrary to the view best represented by von Fintel (1999) , the licensing of NPIs can be disrupted by presuppositions. We provide original data in English and Romance, and make the novel observation that weak NPIs are sensitive to some but not all presuppositions, while strong NPIs are sensitive to all of them. Section 1 presents evidence in support of our claim; section 2 argues that presuppositions should be included in the meaning relevant for NPI licensing and draws a parallel with implicatures; section 3 exposes the flaws of Strawson-entailment, which ensures licensing in the presence of presuppositions; in section 4, we offer reasons to prefer our theory of licensing based on strict downward entailingness.
As a preliminary clarification, we state the licensing condition we adopt in the paper:
(1)
Licensing Condition (after Gajewski 2005) : An NPI α is licensed in a sentence S only if there is a constituent β of S containing α such that β is Downward Entailing with respect to the position of α.
(2) A constituent β is Downward Entailing with respect to the position of α ( α ∈D σ ) iff the function λ x. β [α/v σ ] g [v σ →x] is Downward Entailing (a function F is DE iff for all A, B in the domain of F such that A ⇒ B, F(B) ⇒ F(A), where '⇒' stands for cross-categorial entailment).
Evidence
We produce data which evidence the disrupting effect of some presupposition triggers on licensing: the first subsection deals with weak NPIs, i.e. any, ever, care to, bother with, and the second subsection covers strong NPIs such as in years/ months/weeks, until, either, all that or the minimizers lift a finger, budge an inch, sleep a wink.
Weak NPIs
To our knowledge, the disruptive potential of too has never been noticed. Crucially, the ungrammaticality of (3a) is not due to some incompatibility between too and the negation, as shown by the well-formedness of (3b). The singular definite article and both are disruptors as well (this observation is not new, unlike the one about too, see Lahiri 1998 , Giannakidou 2006 , Guerzoni and Sharvit 2007 :
Context: There is exactly one student who read some books on NPIs.
a. *The student who read any books on NPIs is selling them. b. The student who read books on NPIs is selling them. c. Presupposition of (4b): There is exactly one student who read books on NPIs.
(5) Context: Exactly two students read some linguistics books.
a. *Both students who read any linguistics books have applied to the department. b. Both students who read linguistics books have applied to the department. c. Presupposition of (5b): There are exactly two students who read linguistics books. In Italian, an epistemic predicate, when negated, tends to require the subjunctive mood in the embedded clause; the indicative is also possible though, but in this configuration, it triggers the presupposition that the speaker holds true the complement clause (Homer 2007 ). The following pair shows that the indicative, unlike the subjunctive, disrupts the licensing of the NPI mai 'ever': In the same connection, a cognitive factive verb like se souvenir 'remember' in French allows the indicative/subjunctive alternation when negated. The indicative yields the presupposition that the complement clause is true, and acts as a disruptor, while the subjunctive doesn't: 
Strong NPIs
There is a remarkable difference between weak and strong NPIs: the licensing of the former (as we've just seen) is vulnerable to some but not all presupposition triggers, whereas the licensing of the latter is consistently disrupted by all presupposition triggers. This is true in English, French and Italian. a. *Bill is surprised that Mary has exercised in years.
b. Bill is surprised that Mary has exercised.
c. Presupposition of (19b):
Bill thinks that Mary has exercised.
Analysis
In the previous section, we observed that presupposition triggers are potential disruptors. Is it to say that the mere presence of a presupposition trigger in the constituent upon which licensing is checked can suffice to cause a disruption? To answer this question, let's turn to the very significant minimal pair formed by (3a) (repeated as 20a below) and (21a), in which either replaces too: Given that too and either are very close in meaning but differ with respect to their presuppositions, it is reasonable to think that it is this difference which explains the contrast between (20a) and (21a): contrary to sentence (21b), sentence (20b), which expresses the presupposition of the closest grammatical paraphrase of (20a), contains no subconstituent that is downward entailing with respect to the position of the object of the verb read (the same position that anything occupies in 20a). This discrepancy can only matter to the occurrence of anything in (20a) and (21a) if the process of checking the licensing of the NPI involves considering an enriched meaning which includes, for each sentence, the presuppositions it carries. We thus assume that, alongside the plain meaning of a given sentence Φ, grammar provides an enriched meaning of Φ (henceforth labeled the µ meaning of Φ and noted µ( Φ )), which is the conjunction of the assertive content of Φ and of (the conjunction of) its presuppositions; 2 it is the µ meaning that counts for NPI licensing.
The effect of the µ operator is to turn a trivalent meaning into a bivalent one: 3 (22) Let E be a trivalent meaning. µ(E) = 0 iff E = # or 0 and µ(E) = 1 iff E = 1
In order to show that the ungrammatical (20a) (repeated as 23a below) doesn't provide a downward entailing environment for the NPI anything, we check in (23b)-(23c) whether some constituent of type < t > of the sentence supports an inference from sets to subsets in the relevant position (the set of novels is a subset of the set of books). The constituent we examine is the whole sentence, for the embedded clause lacks any expression denoting a DE function (and as such cannot be a DE constituent). Importantly, we compute an inference from a µ meaning to another µ meaning: (23) Presupposition: Somebody other than John read a novel.
2 Given the definition of the µ operator, we are led to stipulate that the licensing condition should require that the constituent upon which licensing is checked be of type < t >. We thus propose the following formulation: An NPI α is licensed in a sentence S only if there is a constituent β of type
3 As an alternative to building conjunctions, we could adopt the rule that in a trivalent framework, F entails G iff whenever F = 1, G = 1. Thanks to B. Spector for suggesting this solution; we will use conjunctions (µ meanings) as a pedagogical device.
The µ meaning of (23b) fails to entail the µ meaning of (23c), leading to ungrammaticality. We now apply the same procedure to the grammatical (21a), repeated as (26a) below: (26) 
Our claim that the makeup of the presuppositions is a crucial matter for NPI licensing yields an interesting prediction: it should be possible to construct a grammatical sentence whose LF exhibits the same scopal relationships between negation, too and the NPI as the ill-formed (23a) (namely NOT > TOO > ANY), but whose presupposition is DE with respect to the relevant position. 
The contrast between (23a) and (29a) shows that we rightly invoke the presupposition triggered by too as the cause of the ill-formedness of the former.
µ Meanings and Chierchia's Strengthened Meanings
Our proposal, which points at presuppositions as sources of disruption, is interestingly parallel to the one that Chierchia (2004) 
The discovery that presuppositions can disrupt licensing brings to light interesting commonalities between the two types of inferences.
Interesting Consequences
The present paper offers the first touchstone that can differentiate local accommodation and non-projection on the one hand, and non-triggering on the other.
Local Accommodation and Non-Projection
The disruption effect remains even when the presupposition is locally accommodated (i.e. made part of the assertive content in the scope of negation), as in (39) Once triggered, presuppositions cause a disruption, as if the system responsible for NPI licensing processed them blindly. Strikingly, the intervention effects studied by Chierchia also persist when the inference (a scalar implicature) is defeated:
(41) *The students have no background whatsoever, so I doubt that every student has any background.
Non-Triggering
The disruption effect does not obtain when the presupposition is simply not triggered. This can be illustrated with a French cognitive factive predicate like s'apercevoir 'realize', which doesn't yield a presupposition when placed in the antecedent of a subjunctive conditional: A similar phenomenon occurs with implicatures. A numeral like 11 is not always high on its scale, and it can actually be the weakest element of a truncated scale (e.g. in a context where one groups numerals by multiples of 11): then no indirect scalar implicature is triggered, hence the grammaticality of (43a): 
Strawson-Entailment
Our novel observations and the consequent claim about the disruption caused by presuppositions run counter to the commonly accepted view that such an effect simply does not exist. It must be said that a number of presupposition triggers, not only do not disrupt licensing, but seem to cause it. This is notoriously true of sorry, surprise and only.
(44) John is sorry that Mary bought any car.
(45) Meredith is surprised that John has any complaints about the hotel.
(46) Only John ever went to Chicago.
Consider for example (44). Leaving aside for the moment the innovation introduced in the previous section, i.e. µ meanings, it doesn't seem that the inference between (47a) and (47b) goes through, since one can easily imagine scenarios in which John is sorry that Mary bought a car, and the only car she bought is a Mazda (in which case 47b is undefined):
(47) a. John is sorry that Mary bought a car.
Presupposition: John believes that Mary bought a car. b. John is sorry that Mary bought a Honda.
Presupposition: John believes that Mary bought a Honda.
But the inference will be truth-preserving if it is part of contextual knowledge that Mary bought a Honda. 6 Under this assumption, whenever (47a) is true, (47b) is also true, since the assertive content of the former entails the assertive content of the latter, and the latter is, by hypothesis, defined. This is the intuition underlying the widely acknowledged theory of NPI licensing defended in von Fintel (1999): according to von Fintel, the licensing condition should be weakened, since NPIs are licensed despite the presence of the presupposition triggered by only and the emotive factives surprise and sorry. The weakening consists in granting all presuppositions of the consequence when the validity of a downward inference is assessed. This is the spirit of so-called Strawsonentailment, upon which this theory rests. Hence the following definition of Strawson Downward Entailingness:
A function f of type <σ ,t> is Strawson Downward Entailing (SDE) iff for all x, y of type σ such that x ⇒ y and f (x) is defined:
The licensing condition (weaker than the one we gave in section 1) argued for in the paper is thus: 
Singular the and both
The theory, in its original formulation, wrongly predicts that an NPI should be licensed in the scope of the singular definite article:
(53) (Context: There is exactly one student who read some books on NPIs.) *The student who read any books on NPIs is selling them.
(54) a. The student who read a book is selling it. Presupposition: There is exactly one student who read a book.
b. The student who read a novel is selling it. Presupposition: There is exactly one student who read a novel.
Owing to the existence and uniqueness presuppositions carried by singular definite descriptions, in any given model the student who read a book and the student who read a novel are one and the same person: so whatever is predicated of one can also be predicated of the other. This ensures the validity of inferences from sets to subsets but also from subsets to sets. This description of the problem also contains a remedy to it, first identified by Lahiri (1998) : one should exclude from the list of suitable licensers the singular definite article, both, and in general, those functions which are Strawson Downward Entailing and Strawson Upward Entailing at the same time:
(55) Strawson Upward Entailingness: A function f of type <σ ,t> is Strawson Upward Entailing (SUE) iff for all x, y of type σ such that x ⇒ y and f (y) is defined:
In light of these new facts, we amend von Fintel's licensing condition in the following way:
An NPI is only grammatical if it is in the scope of an α that is SDE, non SUE.
The class of suitable licensers (SDE, non SUE) is a proper superset of the class of DE operators. The new licensing condition enables the theory to capture the ungrammaticality of NPIs in the restrictor of singular the and also in the restrictor of both:
(57) (Context: Exactly two students read some linguistics books.) *Both students who read any linguistics books have applied to the department.
(58) a. Both students who read books have applied to the department. Presupposition: There is a set of exactly two students who read books.
b. Both students who read novels have applied to the department. Presupposition: There is a set of exactly two students who read novels.
Notice that singular the and both are not problematic for the µ theory:
Despite the fix, the vFL account can be shown to be flawed, as it is too weak to explain the disruption caused by some presupposition triggers scoping above an NPI and below an SDE, non SUE operator. These are what one might want to call intervention effects (more shortcomings are presented in Homer 2008).
Intervention
Supporters of the vFL account should worry about the prediction it makes regarding the scopal configuration NOT > THE SG > NPI (by THE SG , we mean the singular definite article). The necessary condition that the NPI should be in the scope of some SDE, non SUE operator is met, because negation is one such operator (although the singular definite article, sandwiched between not and the NPI, is not). However, the fact is that the NPI anything is not licensed in the following sentence, as is correctly predicted by the µ theory: 8 (59) (Context: Two men are flirting with Mary; one of the two keeps giving her presents, while the other never offered her anything.) *I don't think the man who gave Mary anything is very smart.
So the syntactic component of the account (operator-based licensing) appears to be incorrect. But the vFL account could still be right, provided it acknowledged that licensing is checked on environments, for the NPI anything in (59) occurs in an SDE, SUE environment ('I don't think the man who gave Mary a Honda is very smart' Strawson-entails 'I don't think the man who gave Mary a car is very smart', because the definite descriptions in the two sentences refer to the same individual). Alas, the disruption caused by too in (3a) (repeated as 60a below) poses a critical problem to the von Fintel/Lahiri theory.
(60) Context: Mary read some interesting book. 8 It would be impossible to rephrase the vFL licensing condition by making the negative stipulation that an NPI must not be in the scope of an SDE, SUE operator, given the grammaticality of the scopal configuration THE SG > NOT > NPI:
Context: There is some student who knew nothing about linguistics.
a. The student who didn't know any linguistics passed all his syntax exams. 
Discussion
Taking stock, the vFL account is too weak and the µ theory is too strong. Should the competition end in a tie?
Hierarchy
Let's first take a better view of the data in English and in French. In Tables 1 and  2 , a star indicates that the trigger is a disruptor, and a check mark indicates that it isn't.
To this date, we haven't been able to determine the criteria that would predict whether a given trigger is a disruptor or not. But the tables are telling nonetheless. English is strictly more permissive than French: the set of French disruptors is If a trigger on the scale is a disruptor in language L, any trigger lower on the scale will also be a disruptor in L, but the converse is not true (α > β reads: 'α is higher on the scale than β '). Another important lesson to draw from the tables above is that all strong NPIs in the languages we've considered fall prey to the disruption effect of presuppositions, while only some weak NPIs do. 9
9 The presupposition of start is DE w.r.t. the relevant position, so its innocuousness, both for weak NPIs and for strong ones, comes as no surprise:
Context: John is a young man who is only interested in poetry, but he might change when he grows older. On the other hand, the µ theory doesn't need a separate licensing condition for strong NPIs: it is a necessary condition for all NPIs, be they weak or strong, that they occur in a DE environment (of course, strong NPIs are subject to some further restrictions, but these must be assumed by both theories). On the other hand, the µ theory must specify which presuppositions should contribute to the µ meaning for the licensing of weak NPIs (keeping in mind that no decision has to be made for strong NPIs, given that all presuppositions are included as far as they are concerned). On the whole, the µ theory is thus more economical than the vFL theory: its superiority lies in the fact that it makes one stipulation instead of two.
Still, one might complain that the stipulation it has to make (some but not all presuppositions count for the µ meaning as far as weak NPIs are concerned) is unsatisfactorily mysterious. But we think the µ theory is well designed to elucidate the mystery: in effect, it treats the assertive content and the presupposition(s) of a sentence Φ as being distinct objects. It is then conceivable that one is manipulated in the absence of the other. If such a circumstance happens, i.e. if only the assertive content of Φ contributes to the µ meaning, NPIs will be licensed provided that the assertive content is DE w.r.t. their positions.
As a consequence, we would like to venture the idea, admittedly largely speculative, that the licensing of weak NPIs and the licensing of strong NPIs do not occur at the same stage (assuming the operations performed by the system follow a sequence): suppose there are various classes of presuppositions, which are computed by the system at different stages, and the classes of presuppositions as well as the order of their computation are fixed across languages (our implicational hierarchy is in fact a sketch of this architecture: the higher a trigger is on a scale, the later its presupposition enters the system). And suppose that what varies, across categories of NPIs 11 and across languages, is the stage at which licensing is checked, or in other words, the stage at which the µ meaning gets computed: this would derive the differing disruptive potentials of triggers, the weak/strong dissimilarity, and the cross-linguistic variations. For example, checking the licensing of any in English might happen before the presuppositions of cognitive factives are computed, while the licensing of quoi que ce soit in French would be checked later; the presupposi-tion of too and aussi would of course be computed earlier than the licensing stage. 12 Strong NPIs, which are characterized by their idiomatic nature (this is at least clear for minimizers) could possibly belong to some very high level, and their licensing be checked at a late stage, when all presuppositions have been computed (at any rate the ones we've looked at). 13 We predict that some language should exist in which one of the high triggers on the scale, e.g. stop, is a disruptor for weak NPIs (and all triggers below it are too).
Conclusion
This paper shows that presuppositions can affect NPI licensing: in doing so, it lends decisive support to the view that inferences can disrupt licensing, and it deprives the idea of Strawson-entailment of its empirical justification.
